Controversy abounds in the UK about increased executive compensation in pri
vatized firms. This study examines the executive pay systems in state-owned
and privatized firms against the backdrop of compensation systems in publi
cly traded firms. We hypothesize the existence of two separate markets for
top management in state-owned and! comparable publicly traded firms from 19
70 to 1981 and the subsequent merging of these markets after privatization
from 1982 to 1994. Consistent with our hypotheses, we document that prior t
o privatization, top management in state-owned enterprises received half th
e compensation of their publicly traded counterparts, and the determinants
of the level of pay were move bureaucratic: there was no pay for performanc
e, little variation across executives and firms, and systematic age-related
pay increases. After privatization, we find a convergence in the level of
executive compensation, the intensity of pay for performance, and the varia
tion and determinants of pay across executives and firms. (C) 1999 Elsevier
Science Inc. All rights reserved.