Insight problem solving is characterized by impasses, states of mind in whi
ch the thinker does not know what to do next. The authors hypothesized that
impasses are broken by changing the problem representation, and 2 hypothet
ical mechanisms for representational change ate described: the relaxation o
f constraints on the solution and the decomposition of perceptual chunks. T
hese 2 mechanisms generate specific predictions about the relative difficul
ty of individual problems and about differential transfer effects. The pred
ictions were tested in 4 experiments using matchstick arithmetic problems.
The results were consistent with the predictions. Representational change i
s a more powerful explanation for insight than alternative hypotheses, if t
he hypothesized change processes are specified in detail. Overcoming impass
es in insight is a special case of the general need to override the imperat
ives of past experience in the face of novel conditions.