Beyond the formalism debate: Expert reasoning, fuzzy logic, and complex statutes

Formalists and antiformalists continue to debate the utility of using legis lative history and current social values to interpret statutes. Lost in the debate, however, is a clear model of hole judges actually make decisions. Rather than focusing on complex problems presented by actual judicial decis ions, formalists and antiformalists concentrate on stylized examples of sim ple statutes. In this Article, Professors Adams and Farber construct a more functional mo del of judicial decisionmaking by focusing on complex problems. They use co gnitive psychological research on expert reasoning and techniques from an e merging area in the field of artificial intelligence, fuzzy logic, to const ruct their model. To probe the complex interactions between judicial interp retation, the business and legal communities, and the legislature, the auth ors apply their model to true important bankruptcy cases written by promine nt formalist judges. Professors Adams and Farber demonstrate how cognitive psychology and fuzzy logic can reveal the reasoning processes that both formalist and antiformal ist judges use to interpret complex statutes. To apply formalist rules, jud ges need to recognize the aspects of a case that trigger relevant rules. Co gnitive psychologists have researched expert reasoning using this type of d iagnostic process. Once the judge identifies the appropriate rules, she wil l often find they point in conflicting directions. Fuzzy logic provides a m odel of how to analyze such conflicts. Next, Professors Adams and Farber consider how these models of judicial dec isionmaking inform efforts to improve statutory interpretation of complex s tatutes. They reason that expert decisionmaking builds on pattern recogniti on skills and fuzzy maps, both the result of intensive repeated experience. The authors explain that cases involving complex: statutory interpretation frequently involve competing considerations, and that the implicit underst andings of field "insiders" tend to be entrenched and difficult to displace . Consequently, Professors Adams and Farber argue that judges in specialty courts, such as the Bankruptcy Courts, are probably in a better position th an generalist appellate judges to interpret complex statutes. Generalist ju dges should approach complex statutory issues with a strong degree of defer ence to the "local culture" of the field. Professors Adams and Farber conclude the Article with speculation on how fu zzy logic could be used in a more quantitative way to model Legal problems. They note that computer modeling may ultimately provide insight into the s ubtle process of judicial practical reasoning, moving away from the false d ichotomy often drawn between forma list and antiformalist approaches to pra ctical judicial decision-making.