Value pluralism and liberal political theory

Building on suggestions by Isaiah Berlin, a number of thinkers have elabora ted a moral theory of value pluralism. Berlin himself believed that value p luralism was consistent with liberalism, which he understood as a political theory giving great weight to the value of negative liberty. Theorists led by John Gray have argued, however, that Berlin's pluralist stance toward v alues is not consistent with his commitment to liberalism. Gray's critique has triggered a wide-ranging theoretical debate, and the purpose of this ar ticle is to assess that debate. I sketch the essentials of value pluralism and explore its implications for liberal political theory. I conclude that Gray's argument modifies our understanding of liberal democracy but does no t drive a wedge between value pluralism and liberal democratic theory. Neve rtheless, it underscores the importance of prudence and attention to specif ic circumstances when using liberal democratic norms to guide the reform of illiberal institutions.