An institutional explanation of the democratic peace

We examine formally the link between domestic political institutions and po licy choices in the context of eight empirical regularities that constitute the democratic peace. We demonstrate that democratic leaders, when faced w ith war, are more inclined to shift extra resources into the war efforts th an are autocrats. This follows because the survival of political leaders wi th larger winning coalitions hinges on successful policy. The extra effort made by democrats provides a military advantage over autocrats. This makes democrats unattractive targets, since their institutional constraints cause them to mobilize resources for the war effort. rn addition to trying harde r, democrats are more selective in their choice of targets. Because defeat is more likely to lead to domestic replacement for democrats than far autoc rats, democrats only initiate wars they expect to win. These two factors le ad to the interaction between polities that is often referred to as the dem ocratic peace.