Counterfactual thinking and regulatory focus: Implications for action versus inaction and sufficiency versus necessity

Counterfactual thinking is associated with regulatory focus in a way that e xplains previous empirical incongruities, such as whether additive counterf actuals (mutations of inactions) occur more or less frequently than subtrac tive counterfactuals (mutations of actions). In Experiment 1, regulatory fo cus moderated this pattern, in that additive counterfactuals were activated by promotion failure, whereas subtractive counterfactuals were activated b y prevention failure. In Experiment 2, additive counterfactuals evoked a pr omotion focus and expressed causal sufficiency, whereas subtractive counter factuals evoked a prevention focus and expressed causal necessity. In Exper iment 3, dejection activated additive counterfactuals, whereas agitation ac tivated subtractive counterfactuals. These findings illuminate the intercon nections among counterfactual thinking, motivation, and goals.