Ja. List et Cf. Mason, Spatial aspects of pollution control when pollutants have synergistic effects: Evidence from a differential game with asymmetric information, ANN REG SCI, 33(4), 1999, pp. 439-452
An asymmetric information differential game is utilized to explore the norm
ative issue: should environmental regulations be carried out locally or cen
trally? Modeling localities as having superior information, or more lenienc
y to adopt new environmental regulations, results from simulations indicate
that local control Pareto dominates central control when enough synergism
occurs between pollutants. In contrast to predictions made by those respons
ible for framing US environmental policy in the 1960s, these findings sugge
st an expanded future role for local governments in providing environmental
protection, particularly in light of Tiebout's (1956) analysis of consumer
s who "vote with their feet" for their preferred basket of public services.
"Practically all the things we've done in the federal government are like t
hings Al Smith did as governor in New York." -Franklin Roosevelt (Schlesing
er, 1960, p.520).