Proverbs are traditionally described either as being a proposition or as be
ing a name. In this paper, I shall concentrate on the second definition typ
e and analyse Kleiber's proposal on that matter. Kleiber claims indeed that
proverbs can be defined by taking into account the nature of the referenti
al relation in which they enter. In this perspective, Kleiber makes of the
referential relation by proverb a referential relation similar to that link
ing a name to its referent. In this sense, proverbs should be considered in
Kleiber's terms as a "metalinguistics" denomination.
The first step of my analysis will consist in checking Kleiber's hypothesis
by testing the validity of such a nominal conception of the proverb. This
investigation will lead to a double conclusion. On the one hand, proverbs e
xhibit referential specificities that are not shared by names. On the other
hand, defining proverbs in purely denominative terms can be shown not to p
rovide a satisfying picture of proverbial semantics. The second step of the
analysis shall then consist in introducing the phrasal dimension that char
acterises propositionalist approaches. The aim will be at that stage to put
together the nominal and phrasal traits observed in all proverbial units.
The last stage of my analysis will consist in describing an interpretive pr
ocedure integrating the specificities of this double proverbial status.