Propositions and indexicals, a defense of Frege's theory

In this paper I argue for a defence of the fregean theory of proposition. F rege claims that every proposition is constituted of senses and that the re ferences never enter into a proposition as its parts. I focus on the propos itions which are expressible by uttering sentences containing indexicals. A ccording to the theorists of direct reference, such propositions are singul ar and have the references of the indexicals among their constituents. My a im is twofold: firstly I want to prove that the criticisms directed against the fregean theory are based on premises which are not acceptable from a f regean point of view and also on misleading interpretations of the fregean notion of sense. Secondly, exploiting the McDowell's idea of the "de re sen ses", I present some general suggestions for a reassessment of the fregean notion of "thought".