The thought experiment offered by Tyler Burge in Individualism and the Ment
al is intended to show that the propositional content of our mental states
is at least in part individuated by the social environment. But if we give
a metalinguistic reformulation of his though experiment, it no longer count
s as relevant for the issue of propositional content. Keith Donnellan offer
ed a metalinguistic reformulation of the thought experiment, but his soluti
on fails to adequately account for the linguistic phenomena Burge draws our
attention on. However, the metalinguistic reformulation may be presented i
n a different version from that offered by Donnellan, in such a way that it
accomodates the relevant linguistic phenomena. This version seems to resis
t to the objections that have been raised by Burge himself and by Pierre Ja
cob. Therefore, there is reason to doubt that Burge's thought experiment su
pports his conclusion about propositional content.