The article analyses the Swedish banking crisis in the early 1990s. Newly d
eregulated credit markets after 1985 stimulated a competitive process betwe
en financial institutions where expansion was given priority. Combined with
an expansive macro policy, this contributed to an asset price boom. The su
bsequent crisis resulted from a highly leveraged private sector being simul
taneously hit by three major exogenous events: a shift in monetary policy w
ith an increase in pre-tax interest rates, a tax reform that increased afte
r tax interest rates, and the ERM crisis. Combined with some overinvestment
in commercial property: high real interest rates contributed to breaking t
he boom in real estate prices and triggering a downward price spiral result
ing in bankruptcies and massive credit losses. The government rescued the b
anking system by issuing a general guarantee of bank obligations. The total
direct cost to the taxpayer of the salvage has been estimated at around 2
per cent of GDP.