We consider a game where agents can synchronize or stagger their decisions.
We compare the outcomes of both timing patterns, and show that spillovers
and strategic interactions are crucial for such a comparison. A typology us
ed in industrial organization, distinguishing four cases ('Fat-Cat', 'Top D
og', Lean and Hungry, 'Puppy Dog'), allows us to compare the actions taken
in the staggered variant and in the synchronized one. The staggered variant
exhibits cycles and players are both better-off, when there are strategic
complementarities between them. A timing game is then set-up so as to endog
enize the choice between the two variants we study.
Two examples are developed: (i) Bertrand competition and (ii) a wage settin
g game when there are two monopoly unions in two interrelated firms. We sho
w that the staggering of price decisions generates counter-cyclical mark-up
s in the first example, and the staggering of wage decisions generates cycl
ing output in the industry in the second example. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science
B.V. All rights reserved.