Formal legal truth and substantive truth in judicial fact-finding - Their justified divergence in some particular cases

Authors
Citation
Rs. Summers, Formal legal truth and substantive truth in judicial fact-finding - Their justified divergence in some particular cases, LAW PHILOS, 18(5), 1999, pp. 497-511
Citations number
17
Categorie Soggetti
Law
Journal title
LAW AND PHILOSOPHY
ISSN journal
01675249 → ACNP
Volume
18
Issue
5
Year of publication
1999
Pages
497 - 511
Database
ISI
SICI code
0167-5249(199909)18:5<497:FLTAST>2.0.ZU;2-7
Abstract
Truth is a fundamental objective of adjudicative processes; ideally, 'subst antive' as distinct from 'formal legal' truth. But problems of evidence, fo r example, may frustrate finding of substantive truth; other values may lea d to exclusions of probative evidence, e.g., for the sake of fairness. 'Jur y nullification' and 'jury equity'. Limits of time, and definitiveness of d ecision, require allocation of burden of proof. Degree of truth-formality i s variable within a system and across systems.