Congressional control of the military in a multilateral context: A constitutional analysis of Congress's power to restrict the President's authority to place United States armed forces under foreign commanders in United Nations peace operations

During the 1990s a number of legislative proposals were advanced to restric t the President's discretion to involve U.S. forces in United Notions (UN) peace operations, A key element of those proposals restricted the authority of the President to place U.S. forces under the tactical or operational co ntrol of UN commanders who were not officers in the U.S. armed forces. In t he one instance in which such a proposal was passed by Congress, President Clinton exercised his veto on the ground that the restriction unconstitutio nally encroached upon the President's power as commander in chief: This art icle examines the constitutional questions raised by those legislative prop osals and concludes that they did not impermissibly encroach upon president ial power.