The owners of professional sports franchises, once minor players in the man
ipulation of locational choices to receive subsidies, now routinely anticip
ate substantial incentive packages from the public sector. Teams demand and
receive subsidies because many communities want teams and the leagues dict
ate the supply of franchises. Periodic disdain over there subsidies and res
entment from communities that have lost teams has not produced public polic
ies to balance the interests of team owners and cities. Ironically, the fed
eral laws that have been passed have enhanced the economic power of the lea
gues. This article explores the impact of the cartel structure of professio
nal team sports and a justification for changing the existing laws. Two dif
ferent strategies are discussed designed to end the sports subsidy: game an
d thwart the incentives that convince some teams to move from one area to a
nother.