Comments on 'Psychologic and the study of memory,' by Jan Smedslund

In his article, "Psychologic and the study of memory," Professor Smedslund (1999) argues that many principles of memory may represent logical truths, rather than empirical ones, an interesting and challenging position. On ref lection, however, I think his view is unlikely to convince large numbers of committed experimentalists. It is only fair to state at the outset that I am one of them. This does not mean that I am unimpressed by Professor Smeds lund's thesis. To the contrary, his article serves as a strong reminder of the importance of using language as carefully and precisely as possible. Cl early, as we engage in scientific endeavor, we rely on the logical aspects of language, with all its constraints, to communicate, just as we do in oth er spheres of our lives. My comments will not address philosophical details to any great extent; ins tead I take the role of an experimentalist trying to grapple with the possi bility that the truth value of psychological principles may be ascertained via logical reasoning, rather than through experimentation, a thought-provo king Venture stimulated by Professor Smedslund's approach. As such, I will focus on experimentation, rather than on other empirical approaches.. Never theless, I suspect that most of us have grumbled from time to time that som eone else's findings are exactly what "my grandmother would have said,"-a n otion of "folk psychology" that Professor Smedslund relates to his psycholo gic. Our own research does not suffer from such a dismissal, of course! The se kinds of thoughts provided a background for my reactions as I wandered t hrough the rich material of Smedslund's article, and they influenced the co mments that follow. The comments begin with general arguments that might be advanced against Sm edslund's psychologic. Then they address some specific examples given in th e treatise. Finally, they present some overall views.