Framing principles and solving problems in memory research

Is the goal of psychology the formulation of a set of principles? Professor Smedslund appears to assume that it is, and furthermore seeks to show that "many psychological principles are logical rather than empirical" (Smedslu nd, 1999). But if the goal of psychology is not the framing of a set of pri nciples, then it may be less pressing to investigate whether those principl es which have been proposed are logical or empirical. The pursuit, independently of experiment, of a set of principles of psychol ogy has a considerable history to it. "Principles of Psychology" was of cou rse the name of the most celebrated of all texts in Psychology, that of Wil liam James (1890). However, James was an advocate of what was, at that time , the new world of psychology experiments. The kind of principles explored by Smedslund resonate more strongly with the products of the associative ph ilosophy which underlay the earlier "Principles of Psychology" of Herbert S pencer (1870-1872)-as Brett (1912-1921, Vol. 3, p. 218) observed of Spencer 's volumes, "From biology in general we are thus led to neurology and to ps ychology. Having in this way prepared a place for psychology, Spencer does little more than drop into it the traditional Associationism". Smedslund hi mself is not an advocate of traditional associationism. Nevertheless, it is possible to see a degree of continuity between his "psychologic" principle s of similarity, ambiguity, salience and attention and, for example, the "l ogic" laws of similarity, contiguity and intensity proposed by John Stuart Mill (1843).