Memory psychology: An empirical or an analytical science?

Citation
Hd. Zimmer et J. Engelkamp, Memory psychology: An empirical or an analytical science?, SC J PSYCHO, 40(4), 1999, pp. 119-122
Citations number
14
Categorie Soggetti
Psycology
Journal title
SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
ISSN journal
00365564 → ACNP
Volume
40
Issue
4
Year of publication
1999
Supplement
S
Pages
119 - 122
Database
ISI
SICI code
0036-5564(199912)40:4<119:MPAEOA>2.0.ZU;2-W
Abstract
Jan Smedslund (1999) made an attempt to show that (memory) psychology is ps eudo-empirical because the laws formulated on the basis of experiments are only apparently empirical. In reality, he claims, the laws are necessarily true because they follow from presuppositions included in the applied conce pts. He stated that in order to understand psychological phenomena, it is s ufficient to work in an armchair, there is no need to enrich our empirical knowledge because the basic insights are logical in nature. Smedslund suppo rted his position by demonstrating that several findings from memory psycho logy logically follow from a small number of axioms in his 'psychologic', a nd these axioms are, in his view, consensually true. Therefore, psychologic al experiments cannot prove or falsify the predictions. In fact, the experi ments only test the realization of the rather uninteresting auxiliary hypot heses. In his view, real empirical predictions are only possible in those c ases when psychological variables are linked to physical or biological vari ables, e.g., brain structures. We do not share his position, and in the fol lowing, we want to develop our arguments.