Power in negotiated and reciprocal exchange

While classical exchange theorists excluded bargaining from the scope of th eir theories, most contemporary theorists have done the opposite, concentra ting exclusively on negotiated exchanges with binding agreements. We analyz e how the form of social exchange-negotiated or reciprocal-affects the dist ribution of power in exchange networks. These two forms of exchange differ in fundamental ways that affect how actors use power and the Rinds of risk and uncertainty they face. We predict that these basic differences will aff ect the relation between the availability of alternative partners and actor s' use of power, and will produce lower power use in reciprocal exchange th an ia negotiated exchange. We test our predictions in a laboratory experime nt. The results support the underlying logic of our theory, partially suppo rt its specific predictions, and raise new questions about the importance o f the different time perspectives required by negotiated and reciprocal exc hange.