If speakers articulate clearly enough to meet the perceptual needs of their
listeners, clarity should depend on what listeners know about (listener-Gi
ven) rather than on what speakers know about (speaker-Given). For words exc
erpted from spontaneous speech, however, intelligibility to naive adult lis
teners showed only effects of the speaker's knowledge. Words introducing la
beled map landmarks to two successive listeners were less clear on repetiti
on even though the second listener had not heard the original mention (Expe
riment 1). Repeated mentions became less clear even after the listener repo
rted inability to see the landmark (Experiment 2). Speakers were affected b
y what they had heard listeners mention: Intelligibility fell equally in co
referential repetitions across and within speakers (Experiment 3), whether
or not the repeater could see the referent (Experiment 4). The results are
explained via fast priming processes dependant on the speaker's knowledge a
nd slow, optional processes drawing inferences about the listener's. (C) 20
00 Academic Press.