The future of philosophy

There is no sharp dividing line between science and philosophy, but philoso phical problems tend to have three special features. First, they tend to co ncern large frameworks rather than specific questions within the framework. Second, they are questions for which there is no generally accepted method of solution. And third they tend to involve conceptual issues. For these r easons a philosophical problem such as the nature of life can become a scie ntific problem if it is put into a shape where it admits of scientific reso lution. Philosophy in the 20th century was characterized by a concern with logic and language, which is markedly different from the concerns of earlie r centuries of philosophy However, it shared with the European philosophica l tradition since the 17th century an excessive concern with issues in the theory of knowledge and with scepticism. As the century ends, we can sec th at scepticism no longer occupies centre stage, and this enables us to have a more constructive approach to philosophical problems than was possible fo r earlier generations. This situation is somewhat analogous to the shift fr om the sceptical concerns of Socrates and Plate to the constructive philoso phical enterprise of Aristotle. With that in mind, we can discuss the prosp ects for the following six philosophical areas: (i) the traditional mind-bo dy problem; (ii) the philosophy of mind and cognitive science; (iii) the ph ilosophy of language; (iv) the philosophy of society; (v) ethics and practi cal reason. (vi) the philosophy of science. The general theme of these investigations, I believe, is that the appraisal of the true significance of issues in the philosophy of knowledge enables us to have a more constructive account of various other philosophical probl ems than has typically been possible for the past three centuries.