Regional responses to the Southeast Asian financial crisis: A case of self-help or no help?

The currency-cum-financial crises of the 1990s, particularly that which hit Southeast Asia after the devaluation of the Thai baht on 2 July 1997, are suggestive of the relevance and pervasiveness of contagion or negative spil lover effects that are largely regional in scope. As such, one of the mantr as since the onset of the Southeast Asian financial crisis has been the nee d for 'regional solutions to regional problems'. Given that the two focal i nstitutions in Southeast Asia, namely the Association of Southeast Asian Na tions (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), were percei ved as being successful in their past attempts in problem-solving, there we re high expectations that such regionalism would be the key in finding solu tions to the Southeast Asian financial crisis and mitigating the aftershock s. Accordingly, this paper evaluates the regional responses to the crisis, taking stock of both preventive and curative initiatives of significance. W hile the focus is on ASEAN and APEC, consistent with the concept of 'loose' or 'non-institutionalised' regionalism in Southeast Asia and the larger As ia-Pacific regions, other ad hoc unilateral or bilateral initiatives of sig nificance by other Asian member countries in APEC are also examined, partic ularly those by the region's dominant economic power, Japan. Current region al responses have not been very successful. This has led to a shift in the emphasis to unilateral and bilateral arrangements. Japan's contribution has been by far the largest relative to others. The crisis and the responses t o it have revealed that unless there is greater institutionalisation, ASEAN countries would continue to look outside the region for assistance to faci litate their recovery.