The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner

Citation
Wv. Gehrlein et D. Lepelley, The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner, ECON LETT, 66(2), 2000, pp. 191-197
Citations number
10
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
ECONOMICS LETTERS
ISSN journal
01651765 → ACNP
Volume
66
Issue
2
Year of publication
2000
Pages
191 - 197
Database
ISI
SICI code
0165-1765(200002)66:2<191:TPTAWS>2.0.ZU;2-#
Abstract
Monte Carlo simulation is used to obtain estimates of the probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner for large electorates unde r the impartial culture condition. While this probability is relatively lar ge for three candidate elections (0.535), it decreases significantly as the number of candidates increases. The same general observations are made whe n considering the probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the Con dorcet winner, given that a Condorcet winner exists. (C) 2000 Elsevier Scie nce S.A. All rights reserved.