The authors advance a general perspective on how to incorporate the notion
of foreign policy substitutability in probabilistic models of international
politics. They suggest that substitutability may be dealt with in one of t
wo ways, namely, (1) through better specification or (2) through the use of
multinomial legit analysis techniques. Their solution is applied to the su
bstantive problem of how internal economic conditions affect the behavior o
f states in enduring rivalries. States in rivalries might react to worsenin
g economic problems by either (1) escalating conflict within the rivalry to
gain the benefits of a diversionary conflict or (2) seeking to settle the
rivalry to free up resources that can be directed toward dealing with econo
mic problems. The possibility that seemingly contradictory policies may be
undertaken requires the use of a model for analysis that takes into account
substitutability. The authors perform empirical analysis to determine how
economic conditions may simultaneously affect the probabilities of dispute
initiation and rivalry termination.