The repression of dissent - A substitution model of government coercion

This article describes a substitution model of states' responses to disside nt behavior and a statistical test of some sequential hypotheses that are d erived from the model. It is motivated by an interest in understanding the sequential response of stales to dissident activity. That is, if dissidents protest, what will the state do next? Similarly, if dissidents are coopera tive, what will the state do next? The author argues that the answer to bot h of these questions depends on the interaction of the state's most recent behavior (i.e., repression or accommodation) and the dissident's response. The model produces the hypothesis that states substitute repression for acc ommodation, and vice versa, in response to dissident protest. Statistical a nalysis of evidence from Peru and Sri Lanka, 1955 to 1991, suggests that th e model captures well the sequential responses of the Peruvian and Sri Lank an governments to dissident behavior during that period.