This research examines results from laboratory experiments in which five hu
man subjects participate as sellers in a Cournot oligopoly environment. The
central issue is whether repeated play among a group of privately informed
subjects will lead to convergence to a unique, static, noncooperative Nash
equilibrium. The experiments were designed so that the implications of dif
ferent hypotheses about adaptation and convergence, such as the best respon
se dynamic and fictitious play, could be distinguished. The results provide
, at best, only partial support for the hypothesis that behavior of private
ly informed subjects will converge to the static Nash equilibrium when play
is repeated. Total output averaged over time periods and across experiment
s is greater than, but still close to, predicted equilibrium total output.
However, observed intertemporal variation in total output and heterogeneity
in individual choices are inconsistent with convergence to the static Nash
equilibrium. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.