Framing the game: Examining frame choice in bargaining

This article introduces the study of frame choice in negotiation. Here, the selection of a procedural frame is treated as a dependent variable-a choic e that bargainers make in addition to determining their offers. The empiric al focus of the article is on whether, when given a choice between two alte rnative versions of the ultimatum bargaining game, negotiators choose the d escription that maximizes their expected payoffs. For example, in one frame -choice task, negotiators assigned to the Player 1 role were asked to selec t between framing the game as "Player 1 proposes a division and Player 2 ac cepts or rejects it" or "Player 1 makes a claim from a common pool and Play er 2 makes a counterclaim." Past research has shown that the second frame l eads to higher expected payoffs for Player 1 than does the first. Across fo ur studies and three established framing effects, it is found that particip ants consistently fail to select the procedural frames that optimize moneta ry outcomes. Subsequent analyses suggest that this tendency is due to two f actors: (a) nonmonetary motivations, such as fairness and respect, that inf luence frame-choice preferences and (b) cognitive limitations that inhibit the ability to accurately predict the effect of alternative procedural fram es on opponents' responses. (C) 2000 Academic Press.