Automatic implantable cardioverter-defibrillators (ICDs) are becoming incre
asingly common, as is refusal of resuscitative efforts at the end of life,
both by patients and surrogate decision-makers. While it is clear that a te
rminally ill patient who lacks decisional capacity may, through a surrogate
, refuse cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), is it appropriate for physici
ans to infer from such a refusal that the patient's ICD should be deactivat
ed? A proper answer to this question requires consideration of the nature o
f consent to a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order, the context in which permiss
ion is given for the writing of the DNR order, and the ontologic status of
implantable devices in general and ICDs in particular. We introduce the con
cept of "biofixtures" and suggest that a biofixture analysis is a novel way
of approaching the difficult ethical issues that may confound the care of
patients with implantable devices.