This essay presents an argument for reconceptualizing subjectivity as orien
tational rather than foundational in nature. My focus is on the work of Emm
anuel Levinas and Immanuel Kant. I begin by summarizing Levinas's theory of
ethical subjectivity as a theory of the self where the internal and the ex
ternal are in constant play. Then I turn to two works of Kant for resources
to understand better the meaning of Levinas's theory of the self. In 'What
is Orientation in Thinking?' Kant presents a model for orientation in thou
ght that I make use of as a basic framework for a model of orientational su
bjectivity. Then I analyze two feelings described by Kant in the third Crit
ique which I argue can be understood as orientational feelings within such
a model of orientational subjectivity: the feeling of sensus communis and t
he feeling of vocation.