Thinking like a game theorist: factors affecting the frequency of equilibrium play

Previous research has reported conflicting results on whether and the exten t to which individuals play equilibria of experimental games. Two experimen ts reported in this paper ask whether the act of eliciting beliefs about th e actions of others influences a subjects' likelihood of playing an equilib rium in a social dilemma or public goods game. The first experiment compare s two versions of a linear public goods game, one with and one without an e licitation of beliefs. Contributions in the two treatments were significant ly different, with the actions of subjects in the elicitation treatment clo ser to the equilibrium prediction of full free riding. A second experiment investigates the same question using a prisoner's dilemma game with similar results; subjects in the elicitation treatment play the dominant strategy significantly more than subjects in a control treatment. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.