Due process, resource mobilization, and the occupational safety and healthadministration, 1971-1996: The politics of social regulation in historicalperspective

Citation
Am. Wahl et Se. Gunkel, Due process, resource mobilization, and the occupational safety and healthadministration, 1971-1996: The politics of social regulation in historicalperspective, SOCIAL PROB, 46(4), 1999, pp. 591-616
Citations number
63
Categorie Soggetti
Sociology & Antropology
Journal title
SOCIAL PROBLEMS
ISSN journal
00377791 → ACNP
Volume
46
Issue
4
Year of publication
1999
Pages
591 - 616
Database
ISI
SICI code
0037-7791(199911)46:4<591:DPRMAT>2.0.ZU;2-S
Abstract
This paper reconsiders the political constraints and organizational dynamic s which limit standard-setting by the Occupational Safety and Health Admini stration. Past research is dominated by class analytic perspectives which t race the failure of regulatory agencies to either direct "capture" by regul ated industries or widespread concern about business confidence. This paper synthesizes the insights of critical legal studies and recent work in poli tical sociology to further specify the social bases of corporate power in t he regulatory arena. Critical legal scholars emphasize the way in which "cl ass neutral" legal statutes create opportunities for capital at the expense of subordinate groups. Recent work in political sociology clarifies the co mplex organizational and institutional dynamics that shape the mobilization of strategic resources in the context of political opportunities. using a sample that covers 25 years, we examine the extent to which due process in standard setting favors capital at the expense of labour due to disparities in resource mobilization. Due process provides capital several opportuniti es to challenge regulatory initiatives. Capital, led by trade associations and Fortune 500 companies, has consistently mobilizes the resources necessa ry to exploit these opportunities. In contrast, organizational constraints have seriously limited the mobilization of labour and its potential allies, including state technocrates, to defend regulatory initiatives. We identif y two far-reaching gains secured by capital given these disparities. On the one hand, the mobilization of a corporate countermovement in any one case may have precluded the effective defence of other regulatory initiatives, s ince the resources of labour and regulatory agencies are easily exhausted. On the other hand, the mobilization of capital has served to safeguard its right to due process and the opportunities this right affords. We conclude that due process in standard-setting in the context of resource disparities necessarily favors capital because it inevitably results in "opportunity c osts," reflected in the hundred of regulatory initiatives that remain dorma nt indefinitely.