Due process, resource mobilization, and the occupational safety and healthadministration, 1971-1996: The politics of social regulation in historicalperspective
Am. Wahl et Se. Gunkel, Due process, resource mobilization, and the occupational safety and healthadministration, 1971-1996: The politics of social regulation in historicalperspective, SOCIAL PROB, 46(4), 1999, pp. 591-616
This paper reconsiders the political constraints and organizational dynamic
s which limit standard-setting by the Occupational Safety and Health Admini
stration. Past research is dominated by class analytic perspectives which t
race the failure of regulatory agencies to either direct "capture" by regul
ated industries or widespread concern about business confidence. This paper
synthesizes the insights of critical legal studies and recent work in poli
tical sociology to further specify the social bases of corporate power in t
he regulatory arena. Critical legal scholars emphasize the way in which "cl
ass neutral" legal statutes create opportunities for capital at the expense
of subordinate groups. Recent work in political sociology clarifies the co
mplex organizational and institutional dynamics that shape the mobilization
of strategic resources in the context of political opportunities. using a
sample that covers 25 years, we examine the extent to which due process in
standard setting favors capital at the expense of labour due to disparities
in resource mobilization. Due process provides capital several opportuniti
es to challenge regulatory initiatives. Capital, led by trade associations
and Fortune 500 companies, has consistently mobilizes the resources necessa
ry to exploit these opportunities. In contrast, organizational constraints
have seriously limited the mobilization of labour and its potential allies,
including state technocrates, to defend regulatory initiatives. We identif
y two far-reaching gains secured by capital given these disparities. On the
one hand, the mobilization of a corporate countermovement in any one case
may have precluded the effective defence of other regulatory initiatives, s
ince the resources of labour and regulatory agencies are easily exhausted.
On the other hand, the mobilization of capital has served to safeguard its
right to due process and the opportunities this right affords. We conclude
that due process in standard-setting in the context of resource disparities
necessarily favors capital because it inevitably results in "opportunity c
osts," reflected in the hundred of regulatory initiatives that remain dorma
nt indefinitely.