Loyalty dilemmas and market reform - Party-union alliances under stress inMexico, Spain, and Venezuela

Market reform has dealt a serious blow to traditional alliances between gov erning parties and labor unions. This article examines the fare of these al liances by applying a revised version of Albert Hirschman's schema of exit, voice, and loyalty to party union relations in Mexico, Spain, and Venezuel a. After refining the concept of loyalty, the author argues that it is embe dded in the principles and norms on which these alliances are based. Market reform places parry-affiliated labor leaders in a "loyalty dilemma" in whi ch they have no choice bur to behave disloyally toward one set of claimants . Their propensity to respond with either voice or exit depends on their vu lnerability to reprisals for disloyal behavior and the party's capacity to retain their loyalty even in the face of sacrifices imposed oil workers and unions. Both variables are linked to the authority structures in which lab or and party leaders find themselves. In the short to medium run the allian ces most Likely to survive are those in which labor leaders have significan t autonomy from their bases and/or in which the party is able and willing t o challenge its own executive. In the long run, however, even these allianc es may be vulnerable to collapse because of popular frustrations with the i nadequacy of interest representation and the multiple pressures on politica l organizations to adapt to a more fluid and uncertain environment.