Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation

We describe strategy-proof rules for economies where an agent is assigned a position (e.g., a job) plus some of a divisible good. For the 2-agent-2-po sition case we derive a robust characterization. For the multi-agent-positi on case, many "arbitrary" such rules exist, so we consider additional requi rements. By also requiring coalitional strategy-proofness or nonbossiness, the range of a solution is restricted to the point that such rules are not more complex than those for the Shapley-Scarf housing model (no divisible g ood). Third, we show that essentially only constant solutions are immune to manipulations involving "bribes." Finally, we demonstrate a conflict betwe en efficiency and strategy-proofness. The results extend to models (without externalities) in which agents share positions. Journal of Economic Litera ture Classification Numbers: C72, D70. (C) 2000 Academic Press.