An example of dynamic (in) consistency in symmetric extensive form evolutionary games

Authors
Chamberland, M Cressman, R
Citation
M. Chamberland et R. Cressman, An example of dynamic (in) consistency in symmetric extensive form evolutionary games, GAME ECON B, 30(2), 2000, pp. 319-326
Citations number
11
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN journal
08998256 → ACNP
Volume
30
Issue
2
Year of publication
2000
Pages
319 - 326
Database
ISI
SICI code
0899-8256(200002)30:2<319:AEOD(C>2.0.ZU;2-X
Abstract
An example is developed to show that equilibrium selection via dynamic stab ility, when applied to the normal form of extensive form games, is inconsis tent with the subgame structure. Alternative dynamic approaches are propose d and discussed to circumvent this inconsistency. Journal of Economic Liter ature Classification Numbers: C70, C72. (C) 2000 Academic Press.