Manipulation in planning: The social choice perspective

The most powerful of the social choice theorems are also highly significant to planning. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, for instance, stares that every procedure For choosing From among at least three outcomes is either d ictatorial or liable to manipulation, which is narrowly conceptualized as a false revelation of preferences. Planning provides opportunities For many other types of manipulation, but there is nor much room for public planning in standard social choice theory, where the ideal is that social decisions should be independent of the procedures leading up to them. However, insti tutionally enriched social choice theory introduces assumptions about agend a formation and other organizational procedures. The effect is that the ent ire planning process is seen to have potential impact on the final decision . A planning version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem can then be formu lated, which implies that one should nor expect utility maximizing planners to always tell the truth in organizational settings where the agents act s trategically in pursuit of their own interest.