The main topic of the paper is a discussion on how to combine disparate sou
rces of information in the safety assessment of software-based systems. Thi
s is based on experience gained through the licensing process of a programm
able system in the Swedish nuclear power plant Ringhals, where a guideline
for reviewing software in safety-related systems was applied. One lesson le
arned from this activity is that the approval of a programmable safety crit
ical system, in particular one which is based on Commercial-Off-The-Shelf s
oftware, is based on a combination of disparate sources of information. Thi
s combination of information is made in a diagrammatic framework. An emergi
ng methodology to combine information about disparate evidences in a system
atic way is based on Bayesian Belief Networks. The objective is to show the
link between basic information and the confidence one can have in a system
. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.