This study analyses the welfare costs of trade distortions in the exch
ange of milk quota by simulating potential quota trade for 1992/93 sub
ject to various trade restrictions. Efficient quota allocation, in an
unrestricted market, comes about when the price of quota is 0.39 guild
ers pel kilogram in 1992/93 prices. A combination of a floor of 10 tho
usand kilograms on quota supply and a ceiling of 75 thousand kilograms
on quota demand results in an efficiency loss of 2.29 per cent of tot
al profit without trade distortions. Incorporating a margin of 2 per c
ent between the demand and supply price has a minor effect, the total
efficiency loss being 0.13 per cent. Another 0.13 per cent accrues to
intermediates in quota trade as transfer costs.