Philosophical assumptions in Freud, Jung and Bion: questions of causality

Citation
M. Horne et al., Philosophical assumptions in Freud, Jung and Bion: questions of causality, J ANAL PSYC, 45(1), 2000, pp. 109-121
Citations number
57
Categorie Soggetti
Psycology
Journal title
JOURNAL OF ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY
ISSN journal
00218774 → ACNP
Volume
45
Issue
1
Year of publication
2000
Pages
109 - 121
Database
ISI
SICI code
0021-8774(200001)45:1<109:PAIFJA>2.0.ZU;2-Q
Abstract
The historical development of concepts of causality in philosophy is descri bed. Since the Enlightenment and the growth of science, exponents of the tw o most important concepts, determinism and teleology, have been in conflict . At the inception of psychoanalysis at the end of the nineteenth century t his conflict was particularly intense. it was the cause of the first major schism in psychoanalysis between Jung and Freud. Psychoanalytic theorists h ave continued to disagree over this issue. Post-modernist philosophy has ab olished all metaphysics and therefore called into question concepts of psyc hic causality. Parallel to, but uninfluenced by this development, Bion has developed a psychoanalytic conceptualization which may be seen as transcend ing causality. The clinical and theoretical implications of these developme nts are described.