Constitutional analysis: The power index approach

Citation
Je. Lane et R. Maeland, Constitutional analysis: The power index approach, EUR J POL R, 37(1), 2000, pp. 31-56
Citations number
13
Categorie Soggetti
Politucal Science & public Administration
Journal title
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH
ISSN journal
03044130 → ACNP
Volume
37
Issue
1
Year of publication
2000
Pages
31 - 56
Database
ISI
SICI code
0304-4130(200001)37:1<31:CATPIA>2.0.ZU;2-U
Abstract
A power index approach to the EU institutions gives a new perspective upon the EU institutions and their future reform. Using a standard power measure , the Banzhaf index, we show that in a group of states as the EU council, t he voting power of a member state is equal to twice the individual power to block multiplied by the group's collective power to change. Political powe r of the member states is calculated under alternative constitutional rules for the EU, where cooperative game theory allows the derivation of power e quivalences. We suggest that simple majority should be used more often in t he EU council.