Winch, Wittgenstein and the idea of a critical social theory

The received understanding of Winch's critique of social science is that he propounded a radically relativist, anti-explanatory and a-critical concept ion of the legitimate task of 'social studies'. This conception is presumed to be predicated upon an extension of Wittgenstein in's critique of philos ophy. I argue, against this view, that Winch reads Wittgenstein through a K antian framework, and that in fact he advanced a rigorously essentialist an d universalist picture of 'social phenomena'. It is Winch's underlying Kant ian metaphysics that has made his ideas attractive to contemporary architec ts of critical social theory such as Giddens and Habermas. However, in oppo sition to the latter, and in spite of his Kantianism, I discern in Winch a genuinely critical attitude towards social understanding.