Wittgenstein and the social context of an individual life

This article argues that two significant implications of Wittgenstein's wri tings for social thought are (1) that people are constitutively social bein gs and (2) that the social context of an individual life is nexuses of prac tice. Part one concretizes these ideas by examining the constitution of act ion within practices. It begins by criticizing three arguments of Winch's t hat suggest that action is inherently social. It then spells out two argume nts for the practice constitution of action that are extractable from Wittg enstein's remarks. Part two contrasts the conception of the social context of individual life as practices with three historically significant concept ions of such a context: totality; sui generis reality; and abstract structu re. It also circumscribes that contemporary movement - practice theory - th at develops the Wittgensteinian position and represents, perhaps, his most significant legacy for social thought.