We propose a model in which economic relations and institutions in advanced
and less developed countries differ as these societies have access to diff
erent amounts of information. The lack of information in less developed eco
nomies makes it hard to evaluate the performance of managers and leads to h
igh "agency costs." Differences in the amount of information have a variety
of sources. As well as factors related to the informational infrastructure
, we emphasize that societies accumulate information by repeating certain t
asks. Poor societies may therefore have less information partly because the
scarcity of capital restricts the repetition of various activities. Two im
plications of our model are (1) as an economy develops and generates more i
nformation, it achieves better risk sharing at a given level of effort, but
because agents are exerting more effort and the types of activities are ch
anging, the overall level of risk sharing may decline; (2) with development
, the share of financial intermediation carried out through market institut
ions should increase.