Rationality and stability in the theory of moves - The case of the prisoner's dilemma

According to Brams' Theory of Moves (TOM), mutual cooperation will emerge i n the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) from all initial states (except initial state (2,2)). Contrary to this result, only applying the rules of TOM to t he PDG (including the precedence norm) yields mutual defection from all ini tial states (except initial state (3,3)). It appears that TOM achieves the cooperative outcomes by introducing a concept of voluntary cooperation (mag nanimity) and an interpretation of self-interest (the Two-Sidedness Convent ion), which are both based on collective rationality. Specifically, these e lements of TOM ignore the conflict between individual and collective ration ality, which characterizes the dilemma of the PDG. In addition, the PDG in TOM is not internally stable in the case of uncertainty with regard to the starting point of the game.