Meaning: Thing, illusion, or both?

This article deals with the clash between two conceptions of a theory of me aning, said to be in strong opposition to each other: the conception of "me aning as use" (the Quinean conception) and a "realistic" conception that id entifies meanings with abstract entities called constructions (P. Tichy's o r P. Materna's conception). In this paper I argue that to get the right perspective on the dispute we s hould first make clear what questions a theory of meaning is supposed to an swer. The questions can be, roughly speaking, divided into three categories : general questions, horizontal questions (i.e. questions concerning logica l and compositional relations among linguistic expressions or their meaning s), and vertical questions (i.e. questions concerning the connections betwe en linguistic expressions and the extralinguistic world). The conflict between the conceptions in question to a large extent stems fr om the fact that they both present closed theories of meaning, i.e. theorie s that aspire to give a single and thorough explication of the nature of me aning. I argue that the two theories should not be taken as competitors in the struggle for a unified complete theory of meaning but rather as unclose d theories aimed at answering different questions. Viewed this way they see m to complement each other in an interesting way. We can then appreciate th e valuable insights into the realm of meaning they offer.