The central claim of Partisan Politics in the Global Economy is that social
democracy continues to be both distinctive and successful in the global ec
onomy in cases where powerful left-of-center parties are allied with strong
and centralized trade union movements. Hay asks whether this means that co
untries without entrenched corporatist institutions must give in to global
market forces by shrinking state activism. The first part of this article d
emonstrates that there is scant evidence that the international integration
of financial markets has been associated with a reduction in fiscal activi
sm in the OECD. This is consistent with my partisan mediation thesis. Here,
however, I wish to take up Hay's challenge of analyzing policy development
s without recourse to my institutional typology. The second part of the art
icle shows that fiscal policy in the OECD has been considerably more restri
ctive where governments have committed to fixed exchange rates. I argue tha
t European countries have nonetheless chosen to fix their exchange rates as
part of the broader regional integration project. The final part of the ar
ticle suggests that the eurozone may well not be dominated by conservative
fiscal policies. The European Central Bank is unlikely to be as conservativ
e as the Bundesbank and the political and economic incentives for fiscal pr
udence in the eurozone are weaker than under the EMS.