Arms races and arms control: Modeling the hawk perspective

Of three major theories developed by post-World War II Americans social sci ence to explain arms races the repeated prisoner's dilemma the spiral model , and the deterrence model, the deterrence model has recieved the least att ention from game theorists. I present a amodel of this perspective and disc uss its implications for arms racing and arms control theory. Arms races ar ise in the model when there is a conflict of interest between two states an d uncertainty about the ability of at least one side to bear the strains of increased military spending. The model provides support for two common ant iques of arms control. First arms control is difficult to achieve when ther e is a dispute accompanied by uncertainty that could lead to war. Second ar ms traces, though they occur in times of tension do not necessarily increas e the likelihood of war and may even reduce it by reducing uncertainity abo ut relative power.