Watermarking codes are analyzed from an information-theoretic viewpoint as
a game between an information hider and an active attacker. While the infor
mation hider embeds a secret message (watermark) in a covertext message (ty
pically: test, image, sound, or video stream) within a certain distortion l
evel, the attacker processes the resulting watermarked message, within limi
ted additional distortion, in attempt to invalidate the watermark. For the
case where the covertext source is memoryless (or, more generally, where th
ere exists some transformation that makes it memoryless),we provide a singl
e-letter characterization of the maximin game of the random coding error ex
ponent associated with the average probability of erroneously decoding the
watermark. This single-letter characterization is in effect because if the
information hider utilizes a memoryless channel to generate random codeword
s for every covertext message, the (causal) attacker will maximize the dama
ge by implementing a memoryless channel as well. Partial results for the du
al minimax game and the conditions for the existence of a saddle point are
also presented.