Merit, management, and neutral competence: Lessons from the US Merit Systems Protection Board, FY1988-FY 1997

Despite the centrality of merit principles to governance in the United Stat es over the past century, scant empirical research examines linkages betwee n institutions, and outcomes in the implementation of merit system protecti ons. We argue that the fate of merit principles depends, at a minimum, on t wo influences that may compete with neutral competence. The first is partis an responsiveness by counter bureaucracies charged with holding agencies ac countable to merit principles. The second influence is the sacrifice of mer it merit in the interest of managerial prerogatives at the agency level. Th is exploratory study assesses both of these influences within the federal g overnment. Our data consist of personal interviews, analyses of U.S. Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) processes, case loads, and decisions between fiscal years 1988 and 1997, and a brief case study of the Justice Departme nt. We find that the MSPB is largely the neutral and competent agency that Congress intended to create when it enacted the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Less positively, OUT analysis also reveals that federal agencies var y in how well their personnel actions fare with the MSPB. This finding is e specially germane to reinventing-government reforms that decentralize perso nnel management to agencies or to line operators within agencies.