Authors
Citation
As. Kritikos et F. Bolle, Indenture: a viable contract for a sequential one-shot Prisoners' Dilemma - A reply to Holt, J ECON BEH, 42(1), 2000, pp. 137-139
Citations number
3
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION
ISSN journal
01672681
→ ACNP
Volume
42
Issue
1
Year of publication
2000
Pages
137 - 139
Database
ISI
SICI code
0167-2681(200005)42:1<137:IAVCFA>2.0.ZU;2-B
Abstract
Holt's argument is wrong. A closer look at the structure of the game and at
the equilibrium selection criterion shows that mutual co-operation is secu
red in an Indenture Game. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserve
d. JEL classification: C72; D89.