The evolution of altruistic behaviour is studied in a simple action-respons
e game with a tuneable degree of conflict of interest, It is shown that for
the continuous, mixed-medium approach no stable polymorphism favours altru
ism. Ecological dynamics are explored with the addition of a spatial dimens
ion and a local energy variable. A continuous spatial model with finite loc
al range does not introduce any substantial difference in the results with
respect to the level of altruism. However, the model illustrates how ecolog
ical coupling may lead to the formation of stable spatial patterns in the f
orm of discrete and isolated clusters of players as a consequence of invers
e density dependence. A discrete, individual-based model is built in which
local interactions are also modelled as occurring within a finite neighbour
hood of each individual and spatial positions are not restricted as in latt
ice models. This model shows substantially different results. A high level
of altruism is observed for low (but positive) degrees of conflict and this
level decreases linearly for higher degrees of conflict. The evolution of
altruism is explained by studying the broken symmetries introduced by the s
patial clusters themselves, mainly between their central and peripheral reg
ions which, in combination with the discrete and the stochastic nature of t
he model, result in the stabilization of strategies in which players behave
altruistically towards the same type. As a consequence of the activity of
the players, energy resources at the centre of an altruistic cluster are ve
ry depleted; so much so that, for low conflict, fitter non-altruistic mutan
ts may initially invade only to become locally extinct due to their less ef
ficient use of energy as their numbers increase. In peripheral regions inva
der may subsist; however, for geometrical reasons long-lasting genealogies
tend to originate only at the centre of a cluster. (C) 2000 Academic Press.